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Monetary Policy as Equilibrium Selection
Gaetano Antinolfi, Costas Azariadis, and James B. Bullard
Can monetary policy guide expectations toward desirable outcomes when equilibrium and welfare
are sensitive to alternative, commonly held rational beliefs? This paper studies this question in
an exchange economy with endogenous debt limits in which dynamic complementarities between
dated debt limits support two Pareto-ranked steady states: a suboptimal, locally stable autarkic state
and a constrained optimal, locally unstable trading state. The authors identify feedback policies
that reverse the stability properties of the two steady states and ensure rapid convergence to the
constrained optimal state. (JEL E31, E42, E58)
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passive—say, too close to a nominal interest rate
peg—allows indeterminacy.
Results with this flavor depend critically on
the expectations of the private sector regarding
future monetary policy actions, and this has led
many to describe the problem of monetary policy
as one of managing or shaping expectations to
rule out private sector beliefs that may send the
economy toward a suboptimal course. How can
policy be designed to stop this process? Can policy
somehow strengthen rational beliefs in the desired
inflation target and in moderate inflationary
expectations?
This paper considers indeterminacy and
monetary policy from a dynamic general equilib-
rium perspective in order to study the robustness
of activist monetary policy advice, like that com-
ing from the large literature on Taylor-type rules.1
We find these results to be quite robust. In fact,
multiple Pareto-ranked dynamic equilibria turn




ndeterminacy, or non-uniqueness, of rational
expectations equilibrium has been a promi-
nent feature of monetary policy analysis since
Sargent and Wallace (1975) found that passive
interest rate policies cause indeterminacy in an
IS-LM framework with rational expectations.
Generally speaking, policy choices influence
equilibrium outcomes, and passive choices can
support multiple equilibria. This situation has
been viewed as one to be avoided if at all possi-
ble; the prospect of the economy coordinating
on the “wrong” set of self-confirming beliefs is
unnecessary at best and detrimental to welfare
at worst. In the standard New Keynesian model,
for example, the monetary policymaker must
follow a sufficiently active policy to avoid
indeterminacy. “Active” means that the policy
instrument cannot be held fixed, or allowed to
fluctuate randomly, but instead must adjust to
the state of the economy according to a specific,
widely understood rule. A policy that is too
1 See the discussion in Woodford (2003) and Bullard and Mitra
(2002). For a discussion of the Taylor principle, see Woodford
(2001).
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the economy. In contrast, some types of informed
active policies eliminate most of the indetermi-
nacy and force the economy onto a constrained
optimal path. Our framework also begins to
address interesting questions concerning the
nature of the interaction between monetary policy
and the smooth operation of credit markets.
What We Do
We study a dynamic general equilibrium
model of pure exchange that is a simplified ver-
sion of Azariadis and Kaas (2007). Following
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Kehoe and Levine
(1993), endogenous debt limits deter default by
households that cannot be forced to repay debts.
These households live forever and have variable
incomes. To keep the analysis tractable, we focus
on an economy with just two types of agents who
share a constant flow of total income. Income
shares fluctuate between low and high levels in
alternating periods. To smooth consumption per-
fectly, high-income agents could in principle lend
a large enough amount to low-income agents each
period to ensure that every household’s share of
total consumption remains constant. We show
that, under certain reasonable assumptions, this
first-best outcome cannot be achieved as an equi-
librium with endogenous debt limits. Instead,
there are two steady states: a constrained efficient
outcome at a high interest rate in which credit mar-
kets work as well as possible and an inefficient
autarkic outcome at a low interest rate in which
credit markets break down and agents are unable
to smooth consumption at all.2 A continuum of
dynamical equilibria indexed by initial conditions
all tend toward the suboptimal steady state.
We introduce policy into this environment.
We discuss the possibility of fiscal tax-transfer
schemes that would in principle work well,
but which also require the policymaker to use
detailed information concerning household
incomes to make the correct resource realloca-
tions. Passive monetary policy, which we think
of as a constant rate of growth of the money stock,
is always associated with indeterminacy and
particularly poor dynamics. We then turn to active
monetary policy, in which the policy instrument
is adjusted in a particular way in reaction to the
current state of the economy. We show that cred-
ible commitment to a certain active policy can
converge to the constrained efficient outcome
immediately if the policymaker reacts to the entire
state of the economy and gradually if the policy
rule responds only to prices. We regard this as a
version of the policy advice coming from related
literature on monetary policy in the face of impor-
tant frictions in the economy, even though the
friction in this paper is quite different. We also
think this result suggests that good monetary
policy is partly responsible for the smooth func-
tioning of credit markets, a sentiment that is often
stated in monetary policy circles.
Recent Related Literature
It is a typical result from the literature that
models with a role for fiat money tend to have a
nonmonetary steady state and an associated
indeterminacy. This is true in models of overlap-
ping generations; but the demand for money
depends on beliefs in the search-theoretic mone-
tary literature as well.3 The model here is more
closely related to Bewley-type economies.4
In the New Keynesian literature, such as
Woodford (2003), credit markets are complete
and work perfectly, even though there are other
frictions in that model. We also have complete
markets, but the friction in our setting directly
affects the incentives of households to lend appro-
priately. Thus, monetary policy in our framework
improves the operation of credit markets, whereas
in Woodford (2003) it has no particular effect on
the operation of these markets.
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2 In the model, credit markets break down completely, but we think
of this as representing poorly functioning credit markets in which
the volume of borrowing and lending is less than it could be.
3 See, for example, the discussion in Wright (2005). Other examples
of indeterminacy include older Keynesian models with rational
expectations, and dynamic general equilibrium structures with
bubbles, complementarities, and increasing returns, such as those
reviewed in Boldrin and Woodford (1990), Cooper (1999), and
Benhabib and Farmer (1999).
4 See Bewley (1980) and Townsend (1980).Our results have a certain global flavor. In part
that is because the model is simple enough that
we can characterize the entire set of equilibria in
a fairly straightforward way. Other authors have
focused on a global perspective in models of
monetary policy, perhaps most prominently
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) and
Benhabib and Eusepi (2005). They emphasize
that active policies may be associated with local
determinacy but global indeterminacy. In
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001), the
second steady state (the one not associated with
the inflation target of the monetary authorities)
is close to the Friedman rule, whereas the second
steady state in our framework is associated with
high inflation. Benhabib and his collaborators
emphasize how the design of policy may or may
not be able to avoid too low an inflation rate rel-
ative to the target, whereas we stress how the
design of monetary policy can avoid inflation
rates that exceed any reasonable target. In partic-
ular, Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) show that, in a
model with sticky prices, a feedback rule can
eliminate global indeterminacy if the monetary
instrument responds to the output gap.
A NONMONETARY MODEL
The economy we have in mind, but do not
analyze here, consists of a large number of agents,
possibly a continuum, with a common utility
function and a large variety of income processes.
Aggregate income can be thought of as constant so
that we may focus on fluctuations in the distribu-
tion of income among households and on the asset
trades they will conduct as they attempt to smooth
consumption. Individual consumption shares will
be constant if asset markets are perfect, but will
necessarily fluctuate if endogenous debt limits
constrain household borrowing.
To simplify matters and maintain tractability,
we analyze an economy with deterministic indi-
vidual incomes populated by two agents indexed
by i = 0,1. Time is discrete and denoted by










with 0 < β < 1. The aggregate endowment is con-
stant at two units, but its distribution over agents
changes deterministically over time. In particular,
individual endowments are periodic5; that is,
(2)
with α ∈￿0,1￿. In addition, agent zero owes an
initial debt, B = α/￿1+β￿, to agent one. This debt
makes the initial wealth of the two agents identi-
cal when incomes are discounted at the common
rate of time preference. In a more complicated
economy, agents would be indexed by α ∈￿0,1￿;
some individual incomes would fluctuate only a
little, others would fluctuate quite a bit.
Perfect Enforcement
To fix ideas and notation, we start with a
standard dynamic general equilibrium model
with perfect enforcement of loan contracts. In
this setting, an equilibrium is an infinite sequence
￿ct
H,ct
L,Rt￿ that describes for each period t con-
sumption for the high- and low-income agents
and the gross yield on loans. This sequence sat-
isfies consumption Euler equations for each per-
son, two intertemporal budget constraints, and
market clearing. Based on our assumptions con-
cerning the initial distribution of wealth, it is obvi-
ous that the unique equilibrium is ￿ct
H,ct
L,Rt￿ =
￿1,1,1/β￿ for all t, and it is Pareto optimal. Indi-
vidual consumption is a constant fraction of
aggregate consumption at all times.
Commitment to repay debts is essential in
achieving this allocation of resources. If borrowers
can in principle default on their loan obligations
at the cost of perpetual exclusion from both sides
of the asset market, as suggested by Kehoe and
Levine (1993), then the Pareto-optimal allocation
cannot be decentralized as a competitive equilib-
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5 In a growing economy, individual incomes need not be negatively
correlated but income shares must be. This simple deterministic
endowment process is the degenerate case of a stochastic economy
with two Markovian states with a zero probability of remaining in
the same state. Markovian endowments with two states are a
straightforward extension. The assumption of two states or dates
has obvious geometric advantages, but it is not innocuous where
policy is concerned. We discuss this point further in the conclusion.preferred to autarky by all agents at all times. It
is easy to check that the current autarky payoff is
(3)
for a high-income agent and
(4)
for a low-income one. These are dominated by
market participation and perpetual consumption
of one unit if, and only if,
(5)
This inequality holds under conditions similar
to those enumerated in Alvarez and Jermann
(2000, Proposition 4.9), which require that all
individuals have a strong need for consumption
smoothing. In particular, inequality (5) holds if
all individuals have a low intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, or a low rate of time preference,
or are subject to large individual income shocks.
Reasonable as they might seem for an economy
with two agents, these conditions are difficult to
achieve in an environment with a large variety of
agent types, some of whom will necessarily expe-
rience small income shocks. In what follows we
assume that inequality (5) fails6 and that autarky





In a more complicated model with a continuum
of agents indexed by α, inequality (7) would have
to hold for some interval of α, in particular for
the highest values of α.7
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These relations are shown in Figure 1, where
the first-best allocation is on the diagonal and
point A represents autarky. An implied interest
factor of unity corresponds to point M.
Limited Enforcement
In environments where loan contracts are
enforced by perpetual exclusion of defaulters
from asset markets, equilibria are defined some-
what differently from standard models. In par-
ticular, an equilibrium is an infinite sequence,
￿ct
H,ct
L,Rt,bt￿, where bt is the debt limit assigned
to the low-income person at t. Agents maximize
taking Rt and bt as given, markets clear, and bt is
the largest possible debt limit that will keep bor-
rowers at t from defaulting at date t + 1. These
limits must be binding by inequality (6), which
states that the first-best allocation ￿ct
H,ct
L￿ = ￿1,1￿￿t
is ruled out by debt limits. In particular, (i) the
consumption Euler equation holds for the high-
income agent and fails for the low-income agent;
that is,
(8)
(ii) Budget constraints apply, with the low-income
agent borrowing at the debt limit from the high-




(iii) Markets clear; that is,
(11)
And (iv) debt limits equate the autarkic and market
payoffs for a high-income consumer who is about
to repay last period’s debt; specifically,
(12)
for all t.
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6 If inequality (5) fails, then it is straightforward to show that high-
income agents will prefer autarky to the perfect enforcement
allocation for any initial distribution of debt, not just for the dis-
tribution assumed in this paper.
7 If the utility function were logarithmic, inequality (7) would
require that the maximal value of α should exceed ￿1 – β￿/￿1 + β￿,
which implies that the maximal annual fluctuation in individual
Antinolfi, Azariadis, Bullard
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income should be no less than approximately 2 percent. Hence, it
seems quite plausible that the first-best allocation will be prevented
by endogenous debt limits.If we define ct
H = xt ∈ ￿1,1+α￿, then it is clear
that equilibria are solution sequences to equation
(12), that is, to
(13)
These sequences are shown in Figure 1.
Real Indeterminacy
If inequalities (6) and (7) hold, Figure 1 shows
that there are two steady states. This first is a sta-
ble autarkic state, ￿ct
H,ct
L,Rt,bt￿ = ￿1+α,1–α, R –,0￿
for all t, where
ux u x u u tt ( )+− ( ) =+ ( )+− ( ) + βα β α 21 1 1 .
(14)
This state corresponds to point A in Figure 1.
The loan market is shut down in this state. The
second is an unstable trade state, ￿ct
H,ct
L,Rt,bt￿ =
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t+1 = 2 – xt+1
A′ = (1 –α, 1+α)
u(1+α –) + βu(1 –α –)
u(1+α) + βu(1 –α)
(1+β)u(1)
A = (1+α,1 –α)
ct
H = xt 1+α –
T = (x ˆ,2 –x ˆ)
T′ = (2 –x ˆ,x ˆ)and
(17)
This state corresponds to point T in Figure 1. The
loan market is active in this state. Because T lies
between point M and the diagonal, we have
(18)
Because autarky is associated with an interest
factor below 1, and the trading state with an inter-
est factor above 1, it follows from Alvarez and
Jermann (2000, Proposition 4.6) that the trading
state is constrained optimal8 and the autarkic
state is not. Individual consumption shares fluc-
tuate less in the constrained optimal state than
they do in the autarkic state.
In addition to the two steady states, there is a
continuum of equilibrium sequences ￿xt￿ indexed
on x0 ∈ ￿x ˆ,1+α￿, which converge to autarky. See
again Figure 1. All of these sequences can be
Pareto ranked by the initial consumption, x0.
Equilibrium outcomes are indeterminate in
this nonmonetary economy for reasons that have
nothing to do with the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption or the lack of gross
substitutes as commonly understood. Instead,
indeterminacy in this environment comes from
dynamic complementarities between current and
expected future debt limits. In particular, low
future debt limits reduce gains from future asset
trading and lower the current payoff to solvency.
This, in turn, raises the incentive to default, which
must be deterred by tighter debt limits now.
We conclude that the constrained optimal
allocation of consumption ￿x ˆ,2–x ˆ￿ can be achieved
only if all future debt limits are expected to stay
exactly at b ˆ. Any other expectations will lead
inevitably to autarky or to the nonexistence of
equilibrium. In the remainder of the paper, we
will explore whether, and how, policies can guide
individual expectations in a manner that leads
away from autarky and, perhaps, toward the
constrained optimal allocation.












PASSIVE FISCAL AND MONETARY
POLICIES
Fiscal Policy with Zero Debt Limits
We explore here the possibility of achieving
the constrained efficient allocation by a passive
fiscal or monetary policy, that is, by choosing
policy instruments that are invariant to the history
of economic events. We start with a constant
lump-sum tax, ˄, on the high-income agent and
an equal subsidy to the low-income agent. Any
tax we choose must support an equilibrium allo-
cation that is weakly preferred to autarky by all
agents at all times. This feasibility requirement
excludes tax and transfer schemes that would
equalize post-transfer endowments in all periods,
thus implementing the first-best allocation xt = 1￿t
as an autarkic equilibrium. However, the policy
˄ = 1+α – x ˆ shifts the endowment point from
point A to point T in Figure 1 and implements
the constrained optimal allocation as a unique
post-transfer autarkic equilibrium at the high-
interest yield, R ˆ ∈ ￿1,1/β￿. All agents weakly
prefer this outcome to the pre-transfer autarkic
equilibrium at the low-interest yield, R – < 1.
The only problem with this policy is that it
relies on precise information about individual
incomes, especially if there were a large variety
of income types. Policy in this setting must be
able to tailor individual transfers to individual
incomes. Are there simpler ways to achieve
desirable outcomes with a blunter policy instru-
ment that requires less information—that is, that
does not discriminate between individuals?
Monetary Policy with Zero Debt Limits
One completely anonymous instrument is
fiat money printed to pay an equal lump-sum
transfer to all agents. Positive lump-sum transfers
flatten the distribution of current resources among
households, and negative transfers skew that
distribution in favor of high-income persons.
This, in turn, enables monetary policy to control
the real yield on money,9 which is the reciprocal
Antinolfi, Azariadis, Bullard
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8 An allocation is constrained optimal if it satisfies the usual resource
constraints, is weakly preferred to autarky by all agents at all times,
and cannot be dominated by another feasible allocation.
9 Identical outcomes can be achieved by changes in the stock of
public debt because money and debt are perfect substitutes in
our economy. We use the term “monetary policy” advisedly hereof the inflation factor, along any equilibrium path.
To see this, we let Mt be the stock of money per
agent, ﾵt be the gross rate of money growth, pt be
the price level, ˄t be the real value of the transfer,
and mt = Mt/pt. Policymakers choose the sequence
￿ﾵt￿ under the restriction that the resulting mone-
tary equilibrium is weakly preferred to autarky
by all agents at all times. We assume that agents
have the option of rejecting monetary transfers
and taxes in favor of autarky.
Assuming for the moment that debt limits
are zero (we relax this assumption in the next
subsection), budget constraints are
(19)
where mt
d is the demand for money by high-
income agents and
(20)
where Rt = pt/pt+1 is the real rate of return on
money. Low-income agents are assumed to be
rationed and to spend their entire money balances
to raise current consumption.
Equilibrium in this economy satisfies the
consumption Euler equation (8) for the high-
income agent, rewritten here as
(21)




In addition, individual budget constraints apply;
that is,
(24)
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We conclude that, for a given policy sequence
￿ﾵt￿, equilibria are bounded non-negative solution
sequences ￿mt￿ to the nonautonomous equation,
(26)
Equilibria that converge to autarky are driven by
self-confirming inflationary expectations that
reduce the demand for real money balances and
diminish trading between high- and low-income
agents. One important drawback of passive poli-
cies is that they are unable to connect future
returns on money with the current state of the
economy and therefore cannot counter inflation-
ary expectations with tighter monetary policy,
that is, by lowering ﾵt.
Figure 2 shows the qualitative properties of
solutions that correspond to a passive monetary
policy, ﾵt = ﾵ ∈[1/R ˆ,1/R –]￿t, for an economy in
which dated consumption goods are gross substi-
tutes. Each policy is associated with two steady
states: a stable autarkic state with m = 0 and an
unstable trading state with m*￿ﾵ￿ > 0. In general,
higher values of ﾵ correspond to lower steady-
state returns on money and to a lower demand
for money, m*￿ﾵ￿. For example, ﾵ = 1/R ˆ ∈￿β,1￿
supports the constrained optimal trading state,
ct
H = x ˆ, for all t by raising the value of real bal-
ances to
(27)
This value of ﾵ, which involves a mild defla-
tion at the steady state of an economy with zero
income growth, is the lowest feasible rate of
growth consistent with all agents preferring mone-
tary equilibrium to autarky at all times. The
Friedman rule, ﾵ = β, which would support the
first-best allocation ct
H = 1 for all t is simply not
feasible: It imposes too large a tax on high-income
agents, causing them to choose autarky over the
use of money. As we raise the value of ﾵ above
1/R ˆ, the amount of trading between the two
groups of agents shrinks, vanishing at ﾵ = 1/R ˆ;
here the steady-state return on money is equal to
the autarkic rate of return.
Figure 2 reveals that feasible passive policies
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because we expect that our results carry over to economies where
debt dominates money in rate of return.self-fulfilling inflationary expectations that leads
to reduced trade among households. To solve this
problem, policy should connect the current state
of the economy with future returns on money,
that is, with expectations of future inflation. We
explore active feedback policies in the “Active
Monetary Policy” section.
Monetary Policy with Positive Debt
Limits
Positive debt constraints add nothing essen-
tial to the equilibria described in the previous
subsection because holdings of private debt are a
perfect substitute for balances of fiat money. A
high-income individual has the same payoff when
trading loans as he would if he held only money.
Loan default does not hurt the trading opportu-
nities of any individual.
If debt limits are a positive sequence ￿bt￿, the
budget constraint for a high-income individual,
(28)
indicates that only the size of the asset portfolio
matters for individual plans, not its division into
fiat money and debt. Money displaces private
loans at a one-to-one rate.
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1+α – x ˆ
1+R ˆACTIVE MONETARY POLICY
Suppose next that monetary policy can con-
trol directly the real yield on money balances in
a manner that depends on the entire state of the
economy. We index that state by ￿xt,Rt￿, where xt
is twice the consumption share of the high-income
agent and Rt is the real yield on money and debt.
Equivalently, we may index the state by ￿mt,Rt￿,
where mt is real balances per capita. Then we
write the policy function as
(29)
The arbitrary function f maps the product space
[1,1+α] ￗ [R –,R ˆ] into [R –,R ˆ]. It should be consistent
with autarky (because autarky is an equilibrium
whenever households refuse to accept fiat money
in exchange for goods) and with the constrained
optimal state ￿x ˆ,R ˆ￿ (because this state is a reason-




An example of this type of policy is
(32)
Given the policy f, an equilibrium is a
sequence ￿xt,Rt￿ that satisfies (29), plus the con-
sumption Euler equation of the high-income
agent, rewritten here as
(33)
By construction, the dynamical system (29) and
(33) has two steady states, ￿x,R￿ = ￿1+α,R –￿ and
￿x ˆ,R ˆ￿. A sensible policy f￿.￿ ensures that equilibria
starting at any point ￿x0,R0￿ move away from the
suboptimal autarkic state ￿1+α,R –￿ and converge
rapidly to the constrained optimal state ￿x ˆ,R ˆ￿.
We do not attempt a global characterization
of policies that achieve this objective for an arbi-
trary utility function u￿.￿. We instead confine
ourselves to exploring the properties of such
Rf x R t tt + = ( ) 1 ,.
Rf R = + ( ) 1 α,,
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policies for a logarithmic utility function in the
neighborhood of each steady state. In this class
of economies, equilibria satisfy
(34)
(35)
All we need do is study the characteristic poly-
nomial p￿ʻ￿ in the neighborhood of any steady
state ￿x,R￿. That polynomial is
(36)
where ʵx and ʵR are partial elasticities of the policy
function f with respect to x and R, and βR < 1 at
each steady state.
Desirable policies, as we have described them,
should turn the constrained optimal steady state
into an attractor, or sink, and the suboptimal state
into a source. The eigenvalues, or roots of the
polynomial g￿ʻ￿, should be inside the unit circle
at ￿x,R￿ = ￿x ˆ,R ˆ￿ and outside the unit circle at
￿x –,R –￿. One way to choose is to focus on functions
f that raise future real yields whenever house-
holds with currently high incomes consume “too
much” (relative to the efficient outcome, x ˆ) and
demand “too little” money.
It is easy to check whether the policy function
in equation (32) has exactly this property, which
would furthermore guarantee immediate conver-
gence to the constrained efficient state ￿x ˆ,R ˆ￿ from
any initial condition other than autarky. Under
this policy, the dynamical system consisting of
equations (34) and (35) has a double real eigen-
value with modulus zero at ￿x ˆ,R ˆ￿.
Exactly what does the monetary authority
have to do to control the real rate of interest in
the manner specified by the policy function in
(32)? This can be answered with a logarithmic
utility function: Combine the budget constraint
(24) with the Euler equation (26) to obtain an
expression that connects monetary policy at date
t+1 with monetary policy at t and with the state
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xR x t tt + =− 1 2 β ,
Antinolfi, Azariadis, Bullard
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2007 339We conclude that monetary policy tightens
(ﾵt+1 falls) subsequent to a rise in the rate of infla-
tion and a drop in the rate of return on money.
Equation (37) says that the tightening appears to
be substantial. For example, if α is small relative
to unity, β is about 0.95, and the ratio of money
to income is about 1:7; then, each additional 1
percentage point of inflation near the constrained
efficient steady state causes the money growth
rate to drop by about 7 percentage points. To see
this, we calculate the response of the money
growth rate to changes to the past inflation rate
from equations (37) and (24) and obtain
Then, we set α = 0 and mt = 1/7.
This is the sort of strongly reactive policy
that guides inflationary expectations to just the
level needed to support the constrained efficient
outcome. In a similar but not quite as effective
way, outcomes can be achieved if the policy rule
simply maps current inflation into future infla-
tion, ignoring current quantities such as xt and
mt. Specifically, if we employ the rule
(38)
where ˆ maps the interval [R –,R ˆ] into itself, then
the dynamical system consisting of equations (34)
and (38) has two real eigenvalues, –βR and ˆ′￿R￿,
at any steady state ￿x,R￿. Recall that βR ∈￿0,1￿ at
both R – and R ˆ.
Therefore, any policy rule such that ￿ˆ′￿R –￿￿ > 1
and ￿ˆ′￿R ˆ￿￿ < 1 will convert the autarkic state A
into a saddle and the trading state T into a sink.
For most initial conditions ￿x0,R0￿, monetary
policy leads the economy to converge asymptoti-
cally, but not immediately, to the constrained
efficient state.
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This paper provides general equilibrium
examples of how active monetary policy can be
used to select a desirable outcome in economies
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In our setting, monetary policy works directly
on rational beliefs about future values of the
inflation rate, debt limits, and other financial
variables. It does so by committing to a feedback
rule that connects current financial conditions
with future values of the policy instrument and,
in particular, to a shared belief that asset returns
will improve substantially when the volume of
asset trading falls below what is consistent with
an efficient allocation of resources.
When viewed as an exercise in equilibrium
selection, monetary policy is an attempt to foster
expectations that lead to socially desirable states
of the economy as rapidly as possible. This attempt
is completely successful in our simple setting
where money is a perfect substitute for private
debt, that is, a store of value for two agents trad-
ing in complete, albeit imperfect, asset markets.
Efficiency in this setting is achieved when the
volume of loans is as large as capital-market
imperfections will allow. If that volume is less
than it should be, properly valued money can
act as a substitute for private loans. The job of
the central bank is to defend the correct value of
money by connecting expectations of future infla-
tion with current economic conditions and inter-
vening aggressively to pin inflation expectations
to the right value.
We are not sure that a blunt policy instrument
such as anonymous monetary policy will be as
successful in selecting constrained optimal out-
comes in a richer environment with many agents
and uncertainty. In particular, if money and debt
are imperfect substitutes because the former has
a liquidity advantage over the latter, then mone-
tary policy has implications for debt limits and
for the participation of households in financial
markets. In addition, policy choices may not be
conditioned on the entire state of the economy if
that state includes detailed information about
individual incomes and trading plans. In that case,
the policymaker may have to settle for something
less than constrained efficiency, as in Benhabib
and Eusepi (2005). These implications need to be
carefully explored before we can design monetary
rules with any degree of confidence.
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